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Settlement of Third Party Liability in
Workman's Compensation
Similar workman's compensation acts have been enacted in all states,
the District of Columbia and in United States territories.1 However, the
statutes differ in defining the effect of injury caused by third party tort-
feasors' on the employer's compensation obligation. Most states provide
that the employer must pay the compensation even when the liability for
the workman's injury lies with a third party,' although several have in-
cluded provisions allowing the workman to elect whether to receive com-
pensation under the statute or to proceed against the actual tortfeasor.
Once compensation has been paid, most states give the employer sub-
rogation rights against the third party, either independently or jointly
with the injured workman.'
The Texas statute' allows the workman to elect whom to go against first.
If he chooses to proceed against the third party, he has no further recourse
under the statute. If he receives compensation from his employer he may
still proceed in a suit against the third party;' but, his employer is sub-
rogated to allow recoupment of the compensation amount before the
workman can retain any money paid by the actual tortfeasor. Once the
employee has collected compensation under the statute, his rights are
limited to funds paid by a third party in excess of the original compensa-
tion amount.
The Texas statute poses a problem as to the effect of a settlement be-
tween the workman and the third party after the former has received
compensation from his employer. This Note is concerned with such settle-
ments and the rights of the three parties, the workman, the employer and
the third party tortfeasor.
Statutory Development. The 1913 Texas Workman's Compensation Act,
and most other state workman's compensation acts, were passed in order
that "the burden of industrial accidents should fall on the employer, be-
cause he is in a better position, by means of prices and insurance, to shift
it to the public."' The original Texas statute provided that the employer
'For a history and the specific provisions of these laws see I A. LARSON, WORKMAN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW ch. 2 (1952 and Supp. 1967); S. RIESENFELD & R. MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL
LEGISLATION 127-36 (1950); 3 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION TEXT (Penna. ed.
1943 and Supp. 1957).
' For a comprehensive discussion of what persons are "third parties," see Durant, Third Person
Liability, 9 UTAH L. REV. 939 (1965).
' For a compendium of statutes see McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture:
A Study of the Liabilities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 389, 393 & n.12 (1959).
4 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1023 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. S 81-13-8 (1963);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 15 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 subd. 3 (1953); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1951); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (Supp. 1961). Arizona, Colorado,
Oklahoma and Washington provide that the employer is liable for a deficiency when the amount
of the judgment against the third party is less than the compensation would have been.
'McCoid, supra note 3, at 394; Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 465, 466-74, 475 & n.81 (1958).
'TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1948).
'Independent E. Torpedo Co. v. Harrington, 128 Tex. 17, 95 S.W.2d 377 (1936); Jackson
v. Hanover Ins. CO., 389 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
sW. PROSSER, TORTS § 79 (3d ed. 1964).
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or his compensation carrier would pay for an employee's injuries, even
when caused by a third party, but did not provide any means for the carrier
to reimburse itself by becoming subrogated to the employee's rights against
the actual tortfeasor.' Moreover, there was nothing to prevent the injured
workman from receiving compensation both from his employer and from
the tortfeasor. If the action against the tortfeasor were settled by the
workman, the carrier could recoup only from him with the result that
it would often be denied any recovery."0 Thus, it was necessary to amend
the Workman's Compensation Act so that any money paid by the tort-
feasor would first be applied to repayment of the compensation. To ac-
complish this, to inhibit the overcompensation of the employee, and to
reduce the cost of the insurance to the employer,11 section 6a was added in
1917. The text of this section reads as follows:
Where the injury for which the compensation is payable under this law was
caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other
than the subscriber to pay damages . . . [and] [i]f compensation be claimed
under this law by the injured employee or his beneficiaries, then the associa-
tion 2 shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee . . . [to]
enforce . . . the liability of said other person, and in case the association
recovers a sum greater than that paid . . . to the employee or his legal bene-
ficiaries, together with a reasonable cost of enforcing such liability . .. then
out of the sum so recovered the association shall reimburse itself and pay
said cost and the excess so recovered shall be paid to the injured employee
or his beneficiaries. 1
Section 6a indicates clearly that even after compensation is paid, the
workman owns the cause of action against the third party, subject only
to the subrogation rights of the employer." But the ability of the employee
to enter a settlement with the actual tortfeasor and the effect of such a
settlement on the rights and liabilities of the three parties are not included
in the terms of the statute. One solution to this problem is the prevention
of further recovery by the injured workman once compensation is paid."
Texas and the majority of states allow the workman to participate in any
recovery from the third party in excess of the compensation paid by the
carrier.
Judicial Development. In Texas the employee's ability to settle his rights
to the excess prior to the actual determination of the recovery amount
has been judicially developed. Beginning with Traders & General Insur-
ance Co. v. West Texas Utilities Co.," the rule has been clearly established
'See Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber Co., 267 S.W. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
"Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 155, 246 S.W.2d 865, 868 (1952). There
is "but one cause of action against the third party tort-feasor" and because of the settlement the
carrier is denied any recovery.
"Consolidated Underwriters v. Kirby Lumber Co., 267 S.W. 703, 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
As used in section 6a, "association" includes private workman's compensation carriers. TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1948).
"TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1948).
14Hayhurst v. Henry, 102 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Tex. 1951); Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. West
Texas Util. Co., 140 Tex. 57, 165 S.W. 703 (1942).
"WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.010 (1961). See also McCoid, sufra note 3, at 395 n.14.
"O 165 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
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that the workman is entitled only to moneys in "excess of the amount of
compensation paid him by the association together with reasonable costs
of enforcing same."' 7 This same theory was clarified in Fort Worth Lloyds
v. Haygood.'8 Fort Worth Lloyds applied section 6a to a settlement with
the workman which was in excess of the compensation amount, holding
that when the tortfeasor paid money to the workman both became jointly
and severably liable to the carrier for the settlement amount." The carrier
was thus assured of a responsible party against whom it could assert its
claim. Thus, in effect, the carrier is able to recoup the total compensation
paid before the injured party can retain any funds given him in settlement
of his individual claims. Unlike normal insurance subrogation practices,
the employee's settlement with the actual tortfeasor is not independent of
the carrier's rights.
A different aspect of the problem was settled in Pan American Insurance
Co. v. Hi-Plains Haulers,s where the Texas Supreme Court decided the
effect of a settlement between an injured workman and a third party tort-
feasor which was less than the compensation paid the employee by the
insurance carrier. That case held that the compensation carrier could have
collected the settlement amount from the employee without releasing the
third party from further liability.' But, the settlement did not subject
the third party to liability to the carrier for both the amount of the settle-
ment and a tort damage verdict. Rather, against the third party the carrier
might recover either the amount of the damages assessed or the amount of
the settlement; but not both.
The employer's choice in Hi-Plains arose solely because the amount of
the judgment was less than either the amount of the settlement or the
compensation. In a more recent supreme court decision, Capitol Aggre-
gates v. Great American Insurance Co.," the court seems to have completed
the final development of third party liability settlements.
Capitol Aggregates. The facts in Capitol Aggregates v. Great American
Insurance Co. were similar to those in Hi-Plains. After paying compensa-
tion to the workman, the insurance carrier brought suit with the workman
against the third party. Immediately before trial, without the knowledge
or consent of the carrier, a settlement was made by the tortfeasor with the
workman for an amount less than the compensation. As part of the settle-
ment agreement, the tortfeasor was to indemnify the employee" in case
'
7 1d. at 715.
18 151 Tex. 149, 156, 246 S.W.2d 865, 869 (1952). "We believe the fundamental principle
underlying [prior cases] is that where compensation has been paid to an injured workman, or
his representatives, and they later file suit against a third party tort-feasor, the first money paid
or recovered by the employee, or his representative, belongs to the carrier paying the compensation,
and until it has been paid in full, the employee or his representatives have no rights to any funds."9 Fort Worth Lloyds v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 157, 246 S.W.2d 865, 869-70 (1952).
20162 Tex. 1, 350 S.W.2d 644 (1961).
" While not clearly stated in the opinion, later clarification by the court indicates that reference
to collecting the settlement amount means from the workman. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Capitol
Aggregates, 408 S.W.2d 922, 924 (Tex. 1966).
22408 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1966).
23 319 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.), afl'd, 408 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1966).
[Vol. 21
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the carrier took the settlement amount from him under the doctrine of
Fort Worth Lloyds. Thereafter, the carrier proceeded to trial and received
a jury verdict in excess of the settlement amount but less than the com-
pensation amount. The trial court entered a judgment against the tort-
feasor in the amount of the jury verdict and against the workman in
the amount of the settlement. The workman was given a judgment of
the settlement amount against the tortfeasor based on the indemnity con-
tract.
2 4
Reaffirming the rule that when a third party tortfeasor pays a judgment
or settlement, the compensation carrier must receive everything up to the
compensation amount before the workman is entitled to participate in the
recovery, the supreme court distinguished this case from its ruling in
Hi-Plains.s The court pointed out that in Hi-Plains both the jury verdict
and the settlement amount were sought from the actual tortfeasorY A
carrier's recovery is not limited to the first money paid to the employee.
Rather, it could collect the amount of the settlement from the workman,
if less than the compensation amount, and this would end the joint and
several liability for the settlement. But, since it would not be fully re-
imbursed, the carrier could proceed against the tortfeasor. If it had col-
lected the settlement from the workman, recovery in the suit would be
limited to the compensation amount less what had already been received.
In Capitol Aggregates, the tortfeasor was required to pay the workman
because of the independent indemnity contract. The carrier had no claim
to the indemnity funds even though it had not been fully reimbursed."
With the carrier having received the settlement amount from the work-
man, the tortfeasor was liable to the carrier only for the jury verdict.
Conclusion. The tortfeasor's liability before settlement is the amount of
the jury verdict." Although in both Capitol Aggregates and Hi-Plaint
the verdict was less than the compensation paid by the association, it could
have been far in excess of that amount. By virtue of the settlement agree-
ment with the injured employee, the third party is successfully able to
put a ceiling on its liability exposure. A settlement for more than the
compensation amount ends the entire claim, the compensation amount
going to the carrier and the excess to the workman. After a settlement of
less than the compensation amount, the third party's liability is no more
than the amount of compensation plus the settlement. If, for instance,
" Although Great American was not fully reimbursed for the compensation amount, the work-
man was able to retain this money because the court felt that the indemnity contract was separate
and independent of the carrier's subrogation rights.
25 408 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1966).
21 In a concurring opinion Justice Smith stated that the court should not have distinguished
this case from Hi-Plains on the basis of the parties but should have overruled Hi-Plains to clearly
establish that the compensation carrier is entitled to all money paid by a tortfeasor up to the
compensation amount. This would, in effect, give the carrier subrogation rights to the indemnity
funds which would create a double liability in the tortfeasor and completely extinguish any rights
of the workman. 408 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Tex. 1966) (concurring opinion).
" Capitol Aggregates v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 396 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965),
aff'd, 408 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. 1966).2
8Pan Am. Ins. Co. v. Hi-Plains Haulers, 163 Tex. 1, 6, 350 S.W.2d 644, 647 (1961).
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the settlement were $2,000, the compensation amount $5,000, and the
jury verdict $25,000, the tortfeasor would pay only $7,000 plus costs of
the litigation.
When a workman is injured during his employment "under circum-
stances creating a legal liability in some person other than"2 his employer,
the employee can sue the third party directly. If he chooses to receive
compensation under the Texas Workman's Compensation Act he does not
give up all rights against the third party. However, the carrier must be
subrogated in such a way as to allow it to recover all money paid by the
actual tortfeasor, up to the amount of compensation, before the employee
can claim any funds."0 The court decisions in these cases achieve a most
favorable result from which several rules can be determined. If the amount
of the settlement given to the employee is less than the compensation paid,
the carrier has a secured right to the settlement amount from the employee
even though they may proceed to trial against the third party. If the judg-
ment is less than the settlement amount, the carrier may elect to receive
the settlement amount in lieu of judgment from the tortfeasor. If the
judgment is more than the settlement amount, the carrier will receive the
judgment from the tortfeasor. If this judgment is less than the compensa-
tion, the carrier can exercise its right to the settlement from the workman
under section 6a. If the tortfeasor has indemnified the workman, the work-
man will be able to recover according to his indemnity contract. The pres-
ence of a settlement agreement should no longer create a problem, but
rather is a situation to which certain determinative rules can be applied.
Robert A. Kantor
29 TEx. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1948).
3 For a discussion of the elimination of employer's participation in third party actions by
subrogation see McCoid, supra note 3, at 450.
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